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I. Introduction
Anti-immigrant parties are taking voters with storm throughout Europe. It is a surprise to some and expected by others. In some countries, these anti-immigrant parties (AIPs) have been a part of the political reality for several decades. This is notably the case in several of the Nordic countries. The Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland) 1 share many similar demographic, historical, and political characteristics. The world knows them for their progressive tax and health care systems, homogenous native populations, long winters, and socialist leanings. Except for the Finnish language, the four countries are often seen as almost identical parts of the same This paper seeks to extend previous arguments for the lack of a "successful" AIP in Sweden until 2006 (Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008 Rydgren, 2010 1 Iceland and Denmark's associated territories, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, are also considered a part of the Nordic countries, but will not be included in this present study. 2 A "successful" AIP is an AIP that has received 5% of the votes in three consecutive national elections (Art, 2011 informed by high levels of immigration (compared to its Nordic neighbors) and no AIP (again, compared to its neighbors). But this narrative is complicated when considering that Sweden has higher rates of right-wing extremist violence per capita than any of its three neighbors combined. I will here attempt to address this puzzle by drawing on previous work on this Swedish exceptionalism and extend them to show how a longstanding tradition of no AIPs has recently changed. However, the structural and cultural explanations for this change as presented are not the only factors in the complex story of an AIP formation. Matters internal to the AIP, the economic story of populism, and different levels of racism can all contribute to the story and will be laid out later in the paper.
II. Successful AIPs
The phenomenon of AIPs is spreading and so is the associated terminology that tries to capture its full meaning. The most common titles for these parties are "nationalist," "far-right," "right-wing," "xenophobic," "populist," and "anti-immigrant" 
III. The Nordic Context
The current study is not a comparative study, but I still believe that we can better approach the puzzle of the Swedish anomaly by putting it in context of its Nordic neighbors. I here include a brief synopsis of the emergence of the successful AIPs in Denmark, Norway, and Finland for contextual purposes. There will be a slight emphasis on Denmark in examples throughout the study.
Denmark
Denmark is home to one of Western Europe's oldest and most influential AIPs. Catholic and Western-minded countries. In 2014 alone, Sweden received more than 100,000 immigrants, the majority of these being Syrian, Eritrean and stateless refugees.
In 2015 this number rose to 160,000, down to 140,000 in 2016, and 125,000 in 2017.
Sweden now takes in more immigrants per capita than any other country in Europe (Hinde & Silberstein, 2017) .
The large amounts of immigrants did not result in a long-standing successful AIP. election (see Table 1 , below). 4 Bevara Sverige Svenskt ("Keep Sweden Swedish") was an anti-immigrant movement formed in 1972 which later merged with the populist party Framstegspartiet ("Progress Party"). The merged party became known as Sverigepartiet ("Sweden Party") but regroup as the Sweden Democrats just two years later in 1988. 2018 (yougov.se, 2018 IPSOS, 2018; SIFO, 2018; Frick; 2018) . Such a result would make SD the biggest party in Sweden with a large margin over the second biggest party, the Social Democrats, who received 22% in the same opinion poll. Although using opinion polls as legitimate markers is difficult, any such result will make SD not only a successful AIP by Art's standards, but also in a position for power that no other AIP has been in Nordic countries. It will be harder for any coalition to form around and might for the first time force the other parties to include an only recent "extreme" AIP in the nation's government.
V. Claims
Two believe the cultural element has a vital part to play.
Since SD has risen to an almost "successful" level over the past decade, it is imperative that we examine if the same variables can explain this new phenomenon. As such, these two independent variables will not only explain the lack of a Swedish AIP but also that a change in these variables has led to a successful Swedish AIP. I expect to see this through the weakening of socio-economic cleavages and the increase in the politicization of immigration issues in Sweden.
Socio-Economic Cleavages
Deep socio-economic cleavages have "protected" Sweden from the rise of an AIP.
Socio-economic cleavages are divisions of voters by social class or identification. Table 1 ).
The same election volatility is seen in the decline of voters who vote for the same party three consecutive elections. Figure 2 shows the percentage of Swedish voters voting for the same (orange) or different (grey) party three elections in a row. 5 Explanations for the otherwise high jump could be seen in the Moderates who had experienced a significant dip in their vote share in the 2002 election, a number that went up again and stayed high from the 2006 elections and onwards. Additionally, the results in 2006 also included 2.1% of the votes to "other parties" and 0.7% of the general vote which went to the newly established Feminist Initiative party, FI (see Table 1 ). Following the trend as depicted in Figure 1 , the volatility of voters is also increasing here. Sweden indicate that such recruiting grounds are now better than ever.
Class voting.
Another aspect of socio-economic cleavages is class voting. As political parties are losing traction all over the Western democratic world, so are traditional "class parties" (Mair, 2013) . As class parties lose their grip on their traditional voters, party loyalty declines, and more maneuver room for an AIP to compete for the votes opens up. This is also the case in Sweden. Figure 3 depicts the percentage of workers and middle-class citizens that voted socialist from 1956-2014. Traditionally, workers have been more likely to vote socialist. As the size of the middle-class has increased, the number of traditional workers has declined. Some of these former workers, now middle-class, continue to vote socialist. However, the overall decline of the socialist votes among these groups have been larger than the increase in middle-class votes for the same. Voter volatility has gone up in Sweden. Volatility has created voters more receptive to AIP recruiting as they switch parties more, are less likely to vote for the same party three elections in a row, and as class voting decrease. Additionally, there has been an increase in voter turnout among politically disinterested voters, indicating that additional dealignment/realignment mechanisms are shifting in Sweden.
Politicization of Immigration
The politicization of immigration issues impacts the likelihood for the success of an AIP. The politicization of immigration issues (along with agenda setting and framing)
increase public attention and awareness on the subject. This can act as an advantage for those political parties with platforms primarily on the issues of immigration. It is partly due to a culture of political correctness and a hesitancy to acknowledge issues surrounding immigration and racism that is found notablly in Swedish, and not to the same degree in Danish culture (Pred, 2000) . The use of the terminology 'political correctness' is here meant to indicate the culturally embedded taboos and inability or lack of political will to discuss specific difficult topics in public.
Political correctness hinders the establishment of AIPs because it keeps immigration from being discussed in public. Thus the "voicing" of concerns is not legitimized or facilitated. New research shows a beginning trend between the absence of such a political "voice" channel (such as an AIP) and higher levels of right-wing violence (Ravndal, 2017) . Although it is possible that Sweden could be an example of such a pattern, more research is needed to solidify this theory. Nevertheless, the politicization of immigration issues is now on the rise in Sweden. Table 2 shows the top election issues among voters in Swedish elections from 1970-2014. When respondents were asked an open-ended question about the issues important to their party choice, the salience of the immigration issue rose from 9-23% from 2010-2014. A similar increase is backed up by a study that goes one year beyond the study presented in Table 2 (see Figure 5 ). In Figure 5 we again see the importance of the immigration issues for voters but see a towering increase in 2015, the year following SD's 12.9% of the votes and the global attention to the refugee crisis. Source: Bergström and Oscarsson (2015) , Demker and van der Meiden (2016) It is difficult to tell whether the politicization is a result of SD's prominence or whether the politicization has resulted in more opportunities for SD (Rydgren, 2010) . It is likely that both are the case. But it is undoubted that SD is changing their image and becoming more mainstream (Rydgren and van der Meiden, 2016) . Figure 6 shows the number of times SD were mentioned in the Swedish media, compared to two other smaller political parties. The increase in the importance immigration issues played for Swedish voters as well as SD's media attention indicates a heightened interest in immigration that is likely due to an increase in the politicization of immigration.
VI. Other Explanations
The Swedish anomaly is a complicated story. Although my primary focus in this paper is on two specific structural and cultural phenomena that explain the changes in (Ravndal, 2017) . Additionally, it has experienced more right-wing violence than have Denmark, Norway, and Finland combined in the same period (ibid.). These three points challenge the idea (often portrayed by Swedish elites (Pred, 2000) ) that Swedes like strangers/immigrants more and therefore have not had an AIP. 
A Difference in Electoral
VII. Conclusion
Previous research has attempted to explain the lack of a Swedish AIP until 2006.
This was done by showing that salient socio-economic cleavages had protected Sweden against the emergence of an AIP and that immigration as an issue had been of lower importance among Swedish voters. Both resulted in structural and cultural conditions that were not conducive to the establishment of an AIP. I have here built on mentioned research by attempting to explain how these same patterns have changed and created a space for SD to become successful.
Waning traditional voting patterns allow fringe-parties to monopolize on floating voters. SD is doing so successfully during a time when voter volatility in Sweden is increasing. Party alliances based on traditional socio-economic patterns have been decreasing, as seen through the decrease in class voting. That is also backed up by the rising numbers of party switchers. When fewer voters stay with the same party as in previous elections, it indicates that voters not previously available are now susceptible to a party change. SD has been able to capitalize on this unfreezing of the traditional voting system, and although the changes did not start when SD arrived, they have been able to capitalize on a changing political landscape and have succeeded in disrupting the system further.
The issue of immigration is now front and center of the Swedish public debate.
That was not always the case, and a heightened politicization of immigration is likely benefitting SD. Although it is hard to prove whether the politicization is a cause or a consequence of the rise of SD, it is a part of a changing culture that is making antiimmigrant stances more legitimate. We see that in the increasing and growing media presence of SD. The culture change around the politicization of immigration thus contributes to the mechanism of moving voters towards SD.
The structural and cultural aspects are not the only determinants of the political change. I have in this paper given a brief overview of the many possible explanations for the change in Sweden. Some are more liable than others, but I hope to have painted the picture of the complex nature of this phenomenon, in spite of giving my primary focus to just two aspects in this paper.
It is clear that Sweden was a Nordic anomaly for many years. But as the political landscape changes, it is becoming more similar to its neighbors. However, we still need to address the difference in the speed and the size of growth that SD, and multiple other recent AIPs or right-wing populist movements in the West, have experienced compared to DPP and others that have slowly and steadily increased over time. How they differ has implications for how we understand AIP formations as well as how we tackle their disruptive nature. Appropriate solutions are unlikely to be found until much more of the life of these AIPs is understood.
